Hurricane Season 2005
ATCA Briefings
ATCA: The Asymmetric Threats Contingency Alliance
is a philanthropic initiative founded in 2001 by mi2g to understand
and to address complex global challenges. ATCA conducts collective dialogue
on opportunities and threats arising from climate change, radical poverty,
organised crime, extremism, informatics, nanotechnology, robotics, genetics,
artificial intelligence and financial systems. Present membership of ATCA
is by invitation only and includes members from the House of Lords, House
of Commons, European Parliament, US Congress & Senate, G10's Senior
Government officials and over 500 CEOs from banking, insurance, computing
and defence. Please do not use ATCA material without permission and full
attribution.
London, UK - 2 December 2005, 16:45 GMT - Response:
Morley Speed; Michael Wade; ATCA: 2005 Hurricane season ends; Lloyd's of London
warns of potential loss; Payouts to exceed 9/11; Most records shattered; Huge
uninsured losses.
Dear ATCA Colleagues
We are grateful to Morley Speed for his personal views in regard to The 2005
Hurricane Season.
Morley Speed is Managing Director of the Reinsurance Division of HSBC Insurance
Brokers. Morley joined the insurance industry in 1978 with Sun Alliance, establishing
the new reinsurance division at HSBC in 1988. He is a member of the Underwriting
Advisory Committee at Lloyds of London. He is also a Fellow of the Chartered
Insurance Institute and a Vice President of the London Institute, having served
as Chairman of the Advanced Studies Committee. He writes:
Dear DK
The 2005 HURRICANE SEASON
There has been much talk in the Reinsurance Market of whether Katrina,
and its accompanying hurricanes, represent a defining moment for the insurance
industry, in the same way as the World Trade Centre in 2001. Although the
losses from the 2005 hurricane season will exceed those from the World Trade
Centre, there are some important distinctions:
a) In 2001 the market was at the bottom of the cycle and was primed to rise
should a major event occur. In 2005 the market was arguably midway on a downward
cycle. It is therefore felt that although those classes of business most affected
by the hurricanes (property, marine and energy) will harden, there will continue
to be softening in other markets.
World Trade Centre affected a wide range of classes of business (the so-called
contagion effect) and consequently caused a consistent rate hike across and
throughout the industry.
b) The hurricane season of 2005 was entirely predictable. While the frequency
of severe hurricanes may have been unforeseen, the characteristics of each
individual hurricane could have been anticipated.
While the World Trade Centre could have been predicted to some extent, its
psychological impact was profound. Many Insurers responded by saying that
such random, man-made events could not be underwritten. Ironically some Reinsurers
are now suggesting that neither can hurricanes be underwritten but
due to their very predictability.
c) The exposure to hurricanes is geographically driven, whereas the threat
of terrorism is global.
While the insurance-buying public could understand the need for a global
increase in rates following the World Trade Centre, there is no such sentiment
with regard to hurricane losses. Many insurers in Europe are questioning the
need to pay higher reinsurance rates to pay for claims in North America involving
floating casinos in hurricane zones.
d) The Insurance industry was severely capital depleted in 2001. By contrast
in 2005 the Balance Sheets of insurers are in a much stronger position
the name of the game now is ROE pick-up [Return on Equity pick-up]
rather than survival. Many sectors/territories in the market do not feel the
need to review their specific strategies; in fact some areas of business remain
extremely competitive with rates reducing by up to 50%.
Taking these distinctions into account it can be seen that it is unlikely
the 2005 Hurricane Season will be a defining event on the scale of the World
Trade Centre. That is the initial view anyway. There may be more long-term
trends at work which could be obscured by certain short-term factors. These
long-term trends may result in Katrina being a tipping
event, if not a defining one.
Chief among these is the superabundance of capital currently available to
bankroll the Reinsurance industry. Latest estimates put this figure at about
USD 15 billion, as compared to the USD 8 billion or so raised after World
Trade Centre. This must be seen in the context of the current savings
glut in the global economy. If anyone need persuasion of the desperation
of investors, witness the recent Dana Gas IPO, which was oversubscribed 140
times and raised a total of USD 78 billion.
All sorts of financial entities are now participating in the reinsurance
market, most notably hedge funds. However one has to ask how resilient these
investors will be, should there be a repeat of the 2005 hurricane season.
Of course this is the critical question. Unfortunately, the preconditions
for increased hurricane activity seem to be embedded in the current cycle
of increased sea temperatures. More generally 2005 has seen an increase in
weather activity which can only be assumed to be a function of global warming,
viz: storms in Scandinavia, record-breaking monsoon rains in Mumbai, India,
and floods in Switzerland.
In such an environment one would have to consider carefully whether one wanted
to roll the dice again on a Gulf hurricane. Although there is
much new capacity (much of which has an appetite for the Gulf and Caribbean
regions) there are some Reinsurers who are withdrawing, or at least reducing
their exposure in the Gulf. One leading Reinsurer has recently informed its
clients that it anticipates a 25% - 30% increase in hurricane activity, as
compared with the existing (historic) models.
At the same time the Security Rating Agencies are suggesting that the financial
model of specialist catastrophe Reinsurers is possibly flawed; or at least
the capital required to support their writings should be such that the cost
of their product will need to increase substantially.
This is coupled with an inevitable hardening of terms in the retrocession
market (where Reinsurers themselves buy reinsurance protection). Either way,
the cost of capital and the cost of retrocession is increasing.
The consequences of reduced capacity in the long-run, as well as increased
rates, cannot be under-estimated with regard to their effect upon fragile
Caribbean economies. Already many territories suffer a heavy insurance burden,
to the extent that many (unfortunately usually the poorer) cannot afford hurricane
cover. In the face of increased hurricane activity there will be significant
economic and social consequences.
There are some voices in the market who say that the hurricane risk has become
uninsurable. With the prospect of a USD 80 billion loss against a Reinsurance
capital base of around USD 250 billion few would argue that it is not a serious
point.
However, a significant aspect of the hurricane losses has been the exposure
of a lack of control and discipline by insurers and reinsurers. Moreover a
large portion of these losses arise from policies issued to Corporations with
capital bases well in excess of their insurers; with a greater grasp of their
own risk exposures than their insurers; obtaining coverage under loose policy
forms that do not restrict recoveries to true indemnity: a sure recipe for
disaster since prestige risks are usually accompanied by prestige losses.
These should not detract from the legitimate risk transfer requirements of
the majority of policyholders.
All depends on what happens in 2006. If there is a repeat of 2005 (or even
of 2004) the capital markets may not be so accommodating; there may be other,
more tempting opportunities, or they may simply feel that it is not worth
rolling the dice again. In which case Katrina may indeed turn
out to be a defining moment.
Should 2006 be loss free, those still in the game will make a lot of money
and the market will embark on yet another phase in the cycle. Yet one cannot
begrudge the Insurers and Reinsurers who are stepping up to take on the risk
in 2006. It is easy to overlook the startling fact that the Insurance Industry
is there to pay out USD 80 billion of losses, and continues trading more or
less normally. However, one cannot but help think that there are tough times
ahead.
If this turns out to be the case, it is likely that the provision of insurance
in Catastrophe-exposed areas will become an issue of broader economic and
social concern.
Kind regards
Morley Speed
[ENDS]
-----Original Message-----
From: Intelligence Unit
Sent: 01 December 2005 18:10
To: ATCA Members
Subject: Response: Michael Wade; ATCA: 2005 Hurricane season ends; Lloyd's
of London warns of potential loss; Payouts to exceed 9/11; Most records shattered;
Huge uninsured losses
Dear ATCA Colleagues
We are grateful to Michael Wade for his views in regard to the 2005 Hurricane
season and the implications for Lloyd's of London and the global insurance
and reinsurance market.
Michael Wade is chief executive of the investment fund manager, The Rostrum
Group, a specialist in the insurance & re-insurance sector. Mr Wade founded
Holman Wade Lloyds insurance broking group in 1980; and later in 1993,
CLM Insurance Fund plc the first listed Lloyds capital provider.
He served on the Council & Committee of Lloyds from 1988 to 1992
and on the Rowland Taskforce in 1991/1992, which set the strategy for Lloyds
eventual reconstruction. He writes:
Dear DK
Thought provoking comments on the 2005 windstorms.
But one might add, if reviewing potential insured catastrophe exposures,
the risk of earthquakes in both the West Coast region of the USA and Canada
and also in Japan. Lloyds realistic disaster scenario (RDS) indicates
potential insured losses of USD 54 billion in the case of the San Andreas
fault; the New Madrid fault at somewhere exceeding USD 75 billion and Japan
around USD 50 billion.
The insurance and reinsurance industry has a very real job to perform; and
the possibility of reaching these sort of numbers is all too easy to predict
under such an event. It is interesting to note that the Bermudian reinsurance
market has raised over USD 12 billion in just a few weeks since the hurricanes;
and in London the sums are less than GBP 1 bn and, even then, much
of the capital is being employed in Bermuda.
And perhaps one of the questions, for those of us in London, is whether the
regulatory and tax regime are globally competitive and appropriate if we are
to remain leaders in the international reinsurance business? Why is the business
now more attracted to Bermuda and Switzerland ?
I would submit that the inability of reinsurers to reserve against pre-tax
results for the long term against catastrophe exposure and the heavy hand
of the FSA in regulating global wholesale business is severely damaging Londons
prospects for the future. When will UK politicians wake up and respond to
the need to permit long term reserving and get the FSA off our backs for wholesale
business?
Michael Wade
[ENDS]
-----Original Message-----
From: Intelligence Unit
Sent: 30 November 2005 22:26
To: ATCA Members
Subject: ATCA: 2005 Hurricane season ends; Lloyd's of London warns of potential
loss; Payouts to exceed 9/11; Most records shattered; Huge uninsured losses
Dear ATCA Colleagues
Lloyd's of London, the world's biggest insurance market, may post its first
annual loss since 2001 after the costliest hurricane season on record triggered
claims of about GBP 2.9 billion (USD 5 billion). "The chances of the
market making a profit in 2005 are now small," Lloyd's said today in
a statement.
Payouts by the over 300-year-old market, established in 1688 at Lloyd's coffee
shop, will exceed claims from the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, which
cost Lloyd's about USD 3.3 billion in its single biggest loss. Total insurance
industry claims from the US hurricanes including Katrina, which damaged oil
rigs, flooded New Orleans, and left hundreds dead in September, may reach
USD 79 billion, according to Risk Management Solutions. Earlier this month,
reinsurance giant Swiss Re estimated that the damage caused by the three hurricanes
would cost the global insurance industry USD 60 billion in total.
Lloyd's today increased estimated net losses from Katrina to GBP 1.9 billion
pounds, from GBP 1.4 billion. Hurricane Rita will probably cost GBP 535 million
and claims from Wilma may reach GBP 483 million, according to the market.
The rating agencies are expected to revisit their credit outlooks, but this
is unlikely to affect the market's ability to trade next year. Companies that
trade at Lloyd's include units of Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway and
AIG, the world's largest insurer by market value. Insurers at Lloyd's, the
world's sixth-biggest reinsurer, specialise in all types of risk.
Lloyd's expects to boost underwriting capacity, or the amount of business
it can insure next year, by 7 percent to 14.7 billion pounds, the market said.
Before the storms, capacity was forecast to decline 7 percent.
The busiest and costliest Atlantic hurricane season on record finally ends
today - 30th November - but meteorologists say it may be years before the
tropical Atlantic settles down. Even as the season comes to an end, tropical
storm Epsilon is gaining power in the central Atlantic, the 26th named cyclone
of a record-beating Atlantic hurricane season. Epsilon poses no threat to
land at present. The last five named cyclones of the season have been named
after letters in the Greek alphabet because the official list of storm names
for 2005 has been exhausted.
At the start of the season, forecasters had warned that 2005 would be hyperactive
because hurricanes feed on warm seas, and ocean temperatures in the tropical
Atlantic region have warmed by 1 to 2 degrees Celsius. Key statistics for
the 2005 Hurricane season, as measured over 150 years, are:
1. Most tropical storms = 26 in 2005 (so far). The old record was 21 storms,
set in 1933;
2. Most hurricanes = 13 hurricanes, with top sustained winds of at least
119km/h. The old record was 12, set in 1969;
3. Category 5 hurricanes = three hurricanes - Katrina, Rita and Wilma - each
reaching Category 5 status with sustained winds over 294km/h. Only 1960 and
1961 had more than one Category 5 storm previously;
4. Most powerful storm = Hurricane Wilma's briefly dropped to 882 millibars,
the lowest ever in the Atlantic-Caribbean basin;
5. Costliest Hurricane Katrina caused at least US 80 billion of damage, making
it the worst natural disaster ever to strike the United States. Hurricane
Katrina thundered into the record books when it tragically submerged New Orleans
and bulldozer damaged the Mississippi coast in late August. The monster storm
killed at least 1,300 people, the most in the US since 1928. Previously 1992's
Andrew was most costly, causing USD 26.5 billion of damage; and
6. Hurricane Stan was deadlier, killing up to 2,000 people with torrential
rains that triggered mudslides and floods in Central America in October.
However, within all the record-breaking statistics of the season, what may
remain hidden is the epic human impact with suffering writ large. US National
Hurricane Centre director Max Mayfield has warned there are only six months
to prepare for the next season, which could be just as bad.
The upper atmospheric winds that can shear off the tops of cyclones have
been mostly absent for the past few years, so hurricanes that form are more
likely to persist. Meteorologists said those conditions were part of naturally
occurring cycles that alternately produce low-and high-activity periods, each
lasting 20 to 30 years.
The current high-activity period began in 1995 and could last another decade
or longer. Not only are there more and stronger storms, but wind patterns
off Africa have steered more of them westward across the Atlantic and into
the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, increasing the number that hit land
this year.
The US weather agencies have asked Congress for a USD 50 million funding
increase next year to pay for additional research flights into storms to improve
forecast techniques. Although they have improved in the last 15 years at forecasting
where a storm will go, they are often defeated in their attempts to predict
how strong it will be when it gets there. Coastal residents often ignore evacuation
orders if they expect a weak hurricane, which leaves them vulnerable if it
intensifies rapidly near shore. And if a strong storm fizzles near shore,
those who flee inland to escape it may be tempted to ignore evacuation orders
next time. The agencies almost always overforecast on rapid development and
underforecast on rapid weakening.
[ENDS]
We look forward to your further thoughts, observations and views. Thank you.
Best wishes
For and on behalf of DK Matai, Chairman, Asymmetric Threats Contingency Alliance
(ATCA)
ATCA: The Asymmetric Threats Contingency Alliance
is a philanthropic initiative founded in 2001 by mi2g to understand
and to address complex global challenges. ATCA conducts collective dialogue
on opportunities and threats arising from climate change, radical poverty,
organised crime, extremism, informatics, nanotechnology, robotics, genetics,
artificial intelligence and financial systems. Present membership of ATCA
is by invitation only and includes members from the House of Lords, House
of Commons, European Parliament, US Congress & Senate, G10's Senior Government
officials and over 500 CEOs from banking, insurance, computing and defence.
Please do not use ATCA material without permission and full attribution.
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